How to produce the belief in clean sports which sells

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Deutscher übersetzter Titel:Wie man den Glauben an einen sauberen Sport produziert, der sich verkauft
Autor:Frenger, Monika; Emrich, Eike; Pitsch, Werner
Erschienen in:Performance enhancement & health
Veröffentlicht:2 (2013), 4 (INDHR 2013), S. 210-215, Lit.
Format: Literatur (SPOLIT)
Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Medienart: Elektronische Ressource (online) Gedruckte Ressource
Sprache:Englisch
ISSN:2211-2669
DOI:10.1016/j.peh.2014.09.001
Schlagworte:
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Erfassungsnummer:PU201501000539
Quelle:BISp
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Frenger, Monika
A2  - Frenger, Monika
A2  - Emrich, Eike
A2  - Pitsch, Werner
DB  - BISp
DP  - BISp
KW  - Betriebswirtschaft
KW  - Compliance
KW  - Doping
KW  - Dopingbekämpfung
KW  - Dopingkontrolle
KW  - Fairness
KW  - Hochleistungssport
KW  - Konsum
KW  - Konsumverhalten
KW  - Leistungssport
KW  - Marketing
KW  - Modell
KW  - Profisport
KW  - Simulation
KW  - Sportorganisation
KW  - Täuschung
KW  - Wettkampf
KW  - Wettkampforganisation
KW  - Zuschauer
KW  - Zuschauerverhalten
LA  - eng
TI  - How to produce the belief in clean sports which sells
TT  - Wie man den Glauben an einen sauberen Sport produziert, der sich verkauft
PY  - 2013
N2  - Organisers of sport competitions sell a product, consisting of athletes’ performance and integrity of competition. These components are consumed simultaneously. Consumer demand for elite sport is at its highest when athletes perform at a high level and when consumers can believe in the athletes’ compliance with the rules. Anti-doping tests are needed because doping cannot be observed directly by consumers but only through the results of doping tests. However, if tests catch too many guilty deviators, consumer belief in the athletes’ compliance diminishes. Organisers of sporting events must decide on the intensity of testing in order to stabilise consumer demand. Intensive testing has the potential to deter athletes from using illicit substances or methods, thus leading to a low rate of detected athletes. A low rate of tests will deter fewer athletes from doping, but will also lead to a low number of detected athletes. Both strategies support consumer belief in compliance with the rules but have differing impact on athletes’ performance. Using a formal model and conducting a numerical simulation, we show that the present rate of about 2% adverse analytical findings is optimal for maximising the economic value of the competition for consumers, organisers, and athletes. Additionally, we show that the maximum utility of a low test rate can be changed if some specific but implausible criteria are met.   Verf.-Referat
L2  - https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peh.2014.09.001
L2  - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211266914000152
DO  - 10.1016/j.peh.2014.09.001
SP  - S. 210-215
SN  - 2211-2669
JO  - Performance enhancement & health
IS  - 4
VL  - 2
M3  - Elektronische Ressource (online)
M3  - Gedruckte Ressource
ID  - PU201501000539
ER  -