TY  - BOOK
AU  - Buechel, Berno
A2  - Buechel, Berno
A2  - Emrich, Eike
A2  - Pohlkamp, Stefanie
DB  - BISp
DP  - BISp
KW  - Beeinflussung
KW  - Doping
KW  - Einfluss
KW  - Hochleistungssport
KW  - Leistungssport
KW  - Prävention
KW  - Spieltheorie
KW  - Sportsoziologie
KW  - Verhaltensanalyse
KW  - Zuschauer
KW  - Zuschauerverhalten
LA  - eng
PB  - Munich Personal RePEc Archive
CY  - München
TI  - Nobody's innocent : the role of customers in the doping dilemma
TT  - Niemand ist unschuldig : die Rolle der Zuschauer im Doping-Dilemma
PY  - 2013
N2  - To which extent high performances in professional sports are based on the use of illicit substances or other doping practices is extremely dificult to measure empirically. Game-theoretical approaches predict strong incentives to dope based on the interaction among athletes (prisoner's dilemma) or the interaction between some control organization and the athletes (inspection game). The role of stakeholders such as customers, sponsors, and the media is either ignored or only informally discussed. One might think that customers who are ready to withdraw their support after a doping scandal, would reduce the incentives to dope. We explicitly model the strategic interaction of such customers with athletes and organizers and strongly refute this (optimistic) conjecture. Customers even trigger doping by putting a threat on the organizers not to conduct serious doping tests. However, we show that this result can be altered by a change in the information structure. If transparency about doping tests is established, then there is a doping-free equilibrium. This has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies, as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities.   Verf.-Referat
L2  - http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44627/1/MPRA_paper_44627.pdf
T3  - MPRA paper
VL  - 44627
M3  - Elektronische Ressource (online)
M3  - Gedruckte Ressource
ID  - PU201305003758
ER  -