Modeling doping cognition from a dual process perspective

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Bibliographic Details
Title translated into German:Die Doping-Wahrnehmung aus einer dualen Prozessperspektive modellieren
Author:Brand, Ralf; Wolff, Wanja; Baumgarten, Franz
Published in:The Psychology of doping in sport
Published:London: Routledge (Verlag), 2016, S. 33-42, Lit.
Format: Publications (Database SPOLIT)
Publication Type: Compilation article
Media type: Print resource Electronic resource (online)
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Identification number:PU201710008795

Author's abstract

From time to time we find ourselves doing things that we never actually intended to do. For example, although one makes a firm decision to avoid unnecessary calories, one may find oneself unable to resist “spontaneously” taking a piece of a delicious cheesecake. Is it possible and reasonable to suggest that something similar may take place in the context of doping behavior? From a more general psychological viewpoint there sometimes seem to be two forces at work, one that is very immediate and more or less uncontrollable and another that is more considered, i.e., based on reasoned thinking and a – possibly subjective – idea of what is rational. This distinction is at the core of psychological dual process approaches. At its most general, dual process theories assume that motivated behavior is rooted in two different kinds of thinking. Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman has stated the characteristic differences between the two types of thought in a clear, comprehensive manner and assigned them into two different cognitive systems:
The operations of System 1 are typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit (not available to introspection), and often emotionally charged; they are also governed by habit and are therefore difficult to control or modify. The operations of System 2 are slower, serial, effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled; they are also rela­ tively flexible and potentially rule governed.