Einleitung

This chapter focuses on what may be seen as a more distinctive, insidious and threatening form of corruption, that involving the manipulation of events on the field. Sometimes such manipulation will be for “sporting” reasons, i.e. the corruptor wants sporting success and is willing to offer explicit or implicit inducements to the corruptee to increase the chance of that success. The first documented example was in the Olympic Games of 388 B.C. when Eupolos of Thessalia bribed three of his fellow competitors in the fist-combat tournament. He won the event, and retained the title of Olympic champion, notwithstanding the improper means, because, under the rules of the time, the title could not be taken away once awarded (Weeber 1991: 118). Much more recently, in 2006, Italian football suffered the Calciopoli scandal. A number of clubs were found to have gained improper advantage in the league competition by, for example, influencing the allocation of referees between matches so that sympathetic offi¬cials could then take decisions on the field which would enhance their prospects in the competition. On this occasion, clubs, including one of the most famous teams in the world, Juventus, were punished, by demotion to the second division. In between these widely separated dates, many other cases could be enumerated. Hill (2009a) presents a compelling picture of the extent to which match-fixing had become systemic in the Russian football league, based on evidence from a series of intercepted arrests, including of officials at the highest level of the governing body, for extensive match-fixing. Attendances collapsed, and both the league sponsor (Pirelli) and the national broadcaster (China Central Television) withdrew from their involvement. Similar patterns of events can be observed in the leagues of Malaysia, Singapore and Albania (IRIS 2012). Revenue loss following revelations of manipulation of sports events has also been evident in Europe, at football clubs implicated in Italy’s Calciopoli scandal: Buraimo et al. (2012) demonstrated sharp drops in attendance at the clubs in question during the following seasons. Third, criminal interests drawn to sport by profits available through match-fixing may gain influence in, or even ownership of, sports clubs, and their positions can then be exploited for other illicit activities, such as money-laundering or the improper exercise of political power, resulting in a general societal risk from (abused) sport betting. (geändert)