Nobody’s innocent : the role of customers in the doping dilemma

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Deutscher übersetzter Titel:Niemand ist unschuldig : die Rolle der Kunden im Dopingdilemma
Autor:Emrich, Eike; Pierdzioch, Christian
Erschienen in:Journal of sports economics
Veröffentlicht:17 (2016), 8, S. 767-789
Format: Literatur (SPOLIT)
Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Medienart: Elektronische Ressource (online) Gedruckte Ressource
Sprache:Englisch
ISSN:1527-0025, 1552-7794
DOI:10.1177/1527002514551475
Schlagworte:
Online Zugang:
Erfassungsnummer:PU201501000538
Quelle:BISp
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Emrich, Eike
A2  - Emrich, Eike
A2  - Pierdzioch, Christian
DB  - BISp
DP  - BISp
KW  - Boykott
KW  - Doping
KW  - Dopingbekämpfung
KW  - Dopingkontrolle
KW  - Konsum
KW  - Leistungssport
KW  - Modell
KW  - Profisport
KW  - Spieltheorie
KW  - Sportorganisation
KW  - Sportpolitik
KW  - Täuschung
LA  - eng
TI  - Nobody’s innocent : the role of customers in the doping dilemma
TT  - Niemand ist unschuldig : die Rolle der Kunden im Dopingdilemma
PY  - 2016
N2  - Customers who boycott an organization after some scandal may actually exacerbate the fraud problem they would like to prevent. This conclusion is derived from a game-theoretic model that introduces a third player into the standard inspection game. Focusing on the example of doping in professional sports, we observe that doping is prevalent in equilibrium because customers undermine an organizer’s incentives to inspect the athletes. Establishing transparency about doping tests is necessary but not sufficient to overcome this dilemma. Our analysis has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities.   Verf.-Referat
L2  - http://jse.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/10/01/1527002514551475.full.pdf+html
L2  - https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002514551475
DO  - 10.1177/1527002514551475
SP  - S. 767-789
SN  - 1527-0025
JO  - Journal of sports economics
IS  - 8
VL  - 17
M3  - Elektronische Ressource (online)
M3  - Gedruckte Ressource
ID  - PU201501000538
ER  -