Nobody’s innocent : the role of customers in the doping dilemma
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Deutscher übersetzter Titel: | Niemand ist unschuldig : die Rolle der Kunden im Dopingdilemma |
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Autor: | Emrich, Eike; Pierdzioch, Christian |
Erschienen in: | Journal of sports economics |
Veröffentlicht: | 17 (2016), 8, S. 767-789 |
Format: | Literatur (SPOLIT) |
Publikationstyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
Medienart: | Elektronische Ressource (online) Gedruckte Ressource |
Sprache: | Englisch |
ISSN: | 1527-0025, 1552-7794 |
DOI: | 10.1177/1527002514551475 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online Zugang: | |
Erfassungsnummer: | PU201501000538 |
Quelle: | BISp |
TY - JOUR AU - Emrich, Eike A2 - Emrich, Eike A2 - Pierdzioch, Christian DB - BISp DP - BISp KW - Boykott KW - Doping KW - Dopingbekämpfung KW - Dopingkontrolle KW - Konsum KW - Leistungssport KW - Modell KW - Profisport KW - Spieltheorie KW - Sportorganisation KW - Sportpolitik KW - Täuschung LA - eng TI - Nobody’s innocent : the role of customers in the doping dilemma TT - Niemand ist unschuldig : die Rolle der Kunden im Dopingdilemma PY - 2016 N2 - Customers who boycott an organization after some scandal may actually exacerbate the fraud problem they would like to prevent. This conclusion is derived from a game-theoretic model that introduces a third player into the standard inspection game. Focusing on the example of doping in professional sports, we observe that doping is prevalent in equilibrium because customers undermine an organizer’s incentives to inspect the athletes. Establishing transparency about doping tests is necessary but not sufficient to overcome this dilemma. Our analysis has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities. Verf.-Referat L2 - http://jse.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/10/01/1527002514551475.full.pdf+html L2 - https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1527002514551475 DO - 10.1177/1527002514551475 SP - S. 767-789 SN - 1527-0025 JO - Journal of sports economics IS - 8 VL - 17 M3 - Elektronische Ressource (online) M3 - Gedruckte Ressource ID - PU201501000538 ER -