On the role of experience in the philosophy of the olympic games

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Deutscher übersetzter Titel:Zur Rolle der Erfahrung in der Philosophie der Olympischen Spiele
Autor:Hogenová, Anna
Herausgeber:Hosek, Vaclav; Tilinger, Pavel; Bilek, Lubos
Erschienen in:Psychology of sport and exercise : enhancing the quality of life ; proceedings of the 10th European Congress of Sport Psychology - FEPSAC, Prague 1999. Part 1
Veröffentlicht:Prag: Univerzita Prag (Verlag), 1999, S. 253-255, Lit., Lit.
Format: Literatur (SPOLIT)
Publikationstyp: Sammelwerksbeitrag
Medienart: Gedruckte Ressource
Sprache:Englisch
ISBN:8086317005
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Erfassungsnummer:PU199912407063
Quelle:BISp

Einleitung

Gadamer stresses the necessity to understand the problem as an answer to which we must seek questions; by finding adequate questions we comprehend the problem; in other words, questions are more important than answers. The original philosophical objective of the Olympic Games is put into antithesis to its present form, i.e. antithesis to commercialization. One of the most venerable ideas of Greek philosophy is the idea of Arete. It was for the sake of this idea that the ancient Olympics were held. But a problem arises when we ask what Arete in fact is. Virtue is mostly spoken of in this connection but it is not as simple as that. It is sufficient to recall Plato's dialogue Menon: how many questions arise here in connection with Arete. Arete understood as prowess is not only an attribute of man but also, for example, of animals, objects, in fact of all, provided that this all participants in creating an overall order, an overall harmony of the universe. The Czech philosopher Jan Patocka asserts that Arete is prowess - ability to further entirety in every individual, specific situation in man's life. But of course, what is it, this whole? Therein lies the greatest problem. The whole is the same as Agathon - Good. For this reason, Arete should be more correctly translated as goodness which is very awkward indeed. Good is something that is absolutely supreme, the most godlike, and its essence lies outside the ideas in the Platonic sense. Einleitung